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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
I·:Ll L\ J l,.~~-, I C 1 1~, L.A \r HE:\CE .J lTS-
rrlCI~~, and ARrrlt1:R A \'"l1~RJ~rrT\ 
Pfaint iffs a Jld Re.'-·l;ond en f.-.,·, 
-vs.-
~ri 1..:\XD.ARD (ilt.jSONITE CC):\lP_.:\K\"'", 
Defendant aud Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RERPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9326 
Counsel for the Plaintiff's agree with the statement 
of f aet~ except as other"rise noted herein. 
There is absolutely nothing in the record that dis-
closes any instructions from Pinder to 1\IcMullin to ob-
tain the ~ervices of an independent mining contractor to 
open up a dormant mine shaft. 
Contrary to Defendant's contentions "rith reference 
to \\Tho \Ya~ in control and had the supervision over plain-
tiffs La"Trence Justice and .t\rthur Averett the court 
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2 
found that all three ,,·ere en1ployees of Standard Gilson-
ite Company. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law.) 
It would appear that had plaintiff, Elba Justice, 
retained the $520.00 check paid to him by Standard 
Gilsonite Company, it still \vould not have precluded 
thP plaintiff's from collecting the balance of their claims. 
(See 34-10-7 lTtah Code Annotated, 1953). 
The plaintiffs presented their claims ti1nely and 
the la\v suit \\ras not delayed by any intentional acts of 
plaintiffs, but had to be filed pursuant to 34-10-6 (U.C.A. 
1953), when it became apparent that the Defendant 'vas 
not going to pay Respondents claims. 
STATEl\1EXT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOW AP-
PLYING TITLE 34, SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, U.C.A. 
(1953) TO THIS CASE WAS NOT ERROR. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COMlVIIT ERROR IN 
UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TITLE 34, 
SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
(1953). 
A. SAID STATUTE IS CONSTI'TUTIONAL AND IS NOT 
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION OF THE LAW. 
B. SAID STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL WHEN 
APPLIED 'TO THIS CASE, AND DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE 
EMPLOYER OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PRO-
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3 
TECTION OF THE LAW WHEN THE EXIST ANCE OF AN 
EMPLOYER El\IPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP IS, IN FACT, 
IN DISPUTE. 
POINT I 
THE RULING OF THE DISTRICT COURT BELOvV AP-
PLYING TITLE 34, SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, U.C.A. 
(1953) TO THIS CASE WAS NOT ERROR. 
rrhe Distriet Court found that the plaintiffs ,\.l~re 
eu1ployees of the defendant company and therefor this 
court is not concerned \\·ith the employee-e1nploy<•r re-
lationship. Defendant's O\Yn brief on page G states ''un-
less the plaintiffs here "\Vere clearly employees, on the 
pa~·roll ... etc.'' the penalt)· statute "\vould not apply. 
The court in its Findings of Fact and ·Conclusions 
of I.Ja\Y held the plaintiffs to be '"clearly e1nployees." 
Plaintiffs \VPre furnished ti1ne sheets by Ralph 
O'X eill to fill out for purposes of paying the1n "\vages. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT COl\Il\IIT ERROR IN 
UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TITLE 34, 
SECTION 10, PARAGRAPH 6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
(1953). 
A. SAID STATUTE IS CONSTI'TUTIONAL AND IS NOT 
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION OF THE LAW. 
The basic and first premise that n1ust be adhered 
to is that the la\YS as passed by the legislature are pre-
snnled to be constitutional and a statute of the type in-
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volved in this case is tlearl:T \vithin the police po\\~er of 
the state to enact. 
The statute involved in this matter is not a denial 
of due process of la\Y or the Pqual protection elause of 
the constitution. The basic eon~ideration involYed in thi;--; 
statute is one of 1nerely protecting the rights of the ein-
ployees \vhen the employer fails to pay \\·ages that are 
due and O\\Ting and attached thereto is the penalt:· proYi-
SlOn. 
\V e find in the case of S ch a lz v. L-:- n io Jl S chao! D i.s-
trict, ·Calif.-137 P2d 7G2, 766 (1943) the follo\ving: 
"The purpose and intent of the act is plain 
and its object should not be defeated by overnice 
construction ... It is not the punish1nent of the 
offender in the sense ordinarily applicable to the 
term, but rather the recovery of the penalty as a 
fixed sum by way of indemnity to the public hy 
reason of the violation of the statute, and to 
charge him a pecuniary liability.H 
Here we are presented \Yith a question concerning 
the po,ver of the State to impose penalties for violation 
of its statutory functions. The presun1ption is that such 
enactments are a legislative n1atter, and the courts should 
be hesitant to meddle therein. It is the usual 1nethod 
imposed to co1npel the perfor1nance of duties or c.onduct 
required by the State in carrying out its varied sovereign 
functions. Thus a legislature 1nay i1npose any reasonable 
penalty it sees fit for the violation of valid regulations. 
There is no inhibition upon the State to impose such 
penalties for disregard of its police power as \vill insure 
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protnpt ohedieneP to tlu~ requi re1nent~ of ~uch rPgulations. 
(~;~ .Jn1. Jur. ()~(i) (Al~o ~PP J.llarlouna r. State-Cal. App. 
:!d--:~1:2 r~. 2d :2;-17-1957.) 
rrhe ~I adonna rase, in quoting fron1 Schalz c. lJ n ion 
!"''cltool !Jist riel. ~upra, ~tated that the penalty provisions 
a:' pronounced b~· the (iourt \YPl'P not in violation of the 
due pro<·Ps~ clau~P. Thi~ case involved a suit to recover 
1noney that "'"as \\·ithheld fro1n a contractor frorn his 
l'inal payn1ent as a penalt~· \vhen the eontractor violated 
the labor code. 11he Court held that the due proce~~ elause 
\\·a~ not violated h~· such a procedurP. 
Coun:-'el for the defendant corporation appPars to 
ba~e hi~ allegation solei~· upon the di~proportionate pe-
c·nniary lo~~ of the defendant corporation and sets forth 
ex~unple~ stating the in1propriety and unreasonablenes~ 
of ~uch a penalty. The exa1nples that he discusses are 
not the fact~ a~ ~Pt forth in thi~ case. 
rrhe reason for the penalty provisions Ill this case 
and in all other cases is to insurP there \\·ill not be flag-
rant violation of the statutes as provided by the Legis-
lature, and if and in the event the statutes are, in fact, 
violated, then a penalty provision is provided against 
the \Yrongdoer for the benefit and protection of the 
public. 
,, ... e find in the case of Department of Social Welfare 
of State r. Gardiner, ______ Cal. ______ , ~10 P.2d 855, 856 
(1949) quoting 21 RCL, page 212, the follo,v-ing: 
.. Penalties are i1nposed in furtherance of 
son1e public policy and as a means of securing 
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obedience to lavv. Persons \Vho incur them are, 
either in morals or la\v, \vrongdoers, and not 
simply unfortunate debtors unable to perfor1n 
their pecuniary obligations." 
In the above-stated case, a statute in California provided 
that the State of ·California could recover hcice the 
amount paid to a person for old age assistance if it \vas 
later discovered that the person so helped had, in fact, 
property and assets that he had failed to disclose to the 
State of ·California; that the State could recover t\vice 
the amount paid to the person receiving assistance. The 
Court in that case held that it was clearly \vithin the 
legislative power of the State to invoke such a penalty 
and that it \\Tas not unreasonable and unconstitutional. 
The penalty provisions as provided in 3±-10-6 (a) of 
the Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) does not fall \\Tithin this 
category and certainly cannot be construed as being un-
constitutional. 
\\T e find that in the very early case of St. Louis v. 
Paul, G-!: .L.\_rk. 83, 40 S.\V". 705, 37 LRA 30±, G~ Am. St. 
Rep. 154, 173 lT.S. -!0-!, ±3 L. ED. 7±6 (1899), that an 
Arkansas Legislative act requiring railroad co1npanies 
to pay their employees \\Then discharged their unpaid 
\vages then earned \\Ti thout deduction, or such \vages 
should continue at the same rate until paid, but not to 
c.rcccrl 60 days con~titutional. (En1p. ours) The Court in 
that case held that such an act \Vas not in violation of 
the e<1ual protection of the la\Y clause. The Court said 
that such an act \vas prospective and its operation and 
restricting future contracts only, and does not deprive 
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the railroad co1npany of their property "Tithout due 
p ro(•ps~ of la " .. 
..,:\ penalty provision, to be unconstitutional, must be 
grossly opprPs~ive and disproportionate to the offense 
connnitted before it can, under any stretch of the imagin-
ation, hP declared to be void. (See Goorh, et al., v. Rogers, 
et al., 1~);~ Or. 158, 238 P.2d 25-l-, ~~5-286-1951.) 
The eases eited in the Appellant's brief, In \vhich 
the Court~ have held certain penalty provisions unconsti-
tutional is due to the fact that theTe is not a li1nitation 
placed upon the penalty provisions in the statute. This 
is basically the reason \vhy they have been held to be 
unconstitutional, and there are cases \\rhich have been 
decided both for and .against the constitutionality of 
penalty statutes. The \Veight of authority, however, 
favors the validity of penalty statutes, when enacted by 
the Legi~lature to correct a \vilful disre·gard for indi-
Yidual rights. An accumulation of the authority and cases 
eited therein are discussed in 12 ALR 612, ~6 ALR 1200, 
1396 and the supplements thereto. 
\\'" e find in the case Nordling v. Johnson, ______ Or. 
______ , :!S3 P2d 994, 289 P:2d -J-:20, ( ______ ) -1-8 ALR 2d 1369, 
a case \\Thich is analogous to the instant case. The ques-
tion involved in that case in the Annotation that follows 
has to do \vith the assignability of the statutory penalty 
\\Then it is invoked. The Supre1ne Court of Oregon did not 
hesitate in holding that the \vages due and the penalty 
provision for said wages \Vas constitutional \Yithout any 
question \vhatsoever. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
The penalty proviston in that ca~e provided that 
\Yhere a \\~illful failure to pay a discharged Plllployee hi~ 
wages \vhen due, then the \vages shall continue at the 
sa1ne rate until paid, unlP~~ action therefon· is eoln-
rnenced, but not 1nore than 30 day~. Our StatutP proYicle:-; 
that it is 1uandatory that the action be connnenced \Yithin 
60 days frorn the date of separation and that is exaetly 
\vhat \Ya~ done in this ca~e. The case involved here and 
the one in the Oregon case sets up a definite tinH· for the 
statute to he invoked and has a cut-off date. The ea~(·~ 
cited by counsel for the defendant are void on their 
face pri1narily because the:~ do not put a lin1itation on the 
length of ti1ne or the a1nount that can be charged under 
the penalt:T provi~ions. Clearly the Court can hold and 
have held that such statutes that are of a continuing 
nature cannot be constitutional because the e1nployer 
could never ascertain the limitation of his liability. 
Our statutP on the other hand is not lmreasonabls, 
eapricious, arbitrary, or an1biguous~ and a~ such, it 
clearly defines the a1nount that the e1nployers \Yill be 
eharged for \Yilful failure to pay his en1ployees \\~age~ 
duP upon discharge. Ile is put on notice by the statute 
that if he fails to pay said \vages and the en1ployee makes 
a de1nand for pay1nent of said funds that the en1ployer 
\\~ill suffer a penalty, but in no case \vill it be for an 
a1nount greater than 60 days "rages. 
Based upon the cases, and 1nore especially the l:-.7 ord-
ling v. Joluu·don, supra, tht)re cannot be any inference to 
the penalt:T provisions in the statute attacked by the 
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defendant are uncon~titutional. ·Clearly it is \vithin the 
province of the Legislature to enact la\vs for the better-
Inent of society and to pron1ote the best \\·elfare of it~ 
tnentbers and further, it is the prerogative of said legi:--:-
lature to envokP penalties for the enforce1nent of its 
statutes. 
It is obvious that a statute in its relationship to 
,,·ages and a penalt~· for failing to pa~· the ~tnne i:-; indeed 
fair, reasonable and susceptible to a constitutional inter-
pretation that it is valid. 
The defendant corporation kne\v that if they \Villfully 
refused to pay the just clai1ns of the plaintiffs herein, 
that they \vould be subjecting themselves to the proviHions 
that are contained in Title 3-t, Section 10, paragraph G, 
l~tah Code Annotated, 1953. Penal statutes have for their 
purpose the punishment of an employer for willful failure 
to 1nake payment of wages when due, and by such pro-
visions the employee is given a preferred position \Yith 
respect to the \vages due and eertainly this is not an 
unreasonable restraint upon the employer. The defendant 
corporation is not in any "·ay denied due process of la\v 
or the equal protection of the la,v, nor have they been 
denied their day in Court under threat of excessive 
penalty. 
B. SAID STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL WHEN 
APPLIED 'TO THIS CASE, AND DOES NOT DEPRIVE THE 
EMPLOYER OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION OF THE LAW WHEN THE EXISTANCE OF AN 
EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP IS, IN FACT, 
IN DISPUTE. 
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Counsel for the defendant corporation feels that said 
corporation has been severely and oppressively put in a 
position whereby they cannot have their day in Court, 
unless and until the employee-employer relationship 
is first decided. Certainly the law provides ren1edies to 
ascertain the employer-employee relationship "·ithout 
\vaiting for the statutory time of the penalty in which to 
file a -claim has already run. 
Certainly there \Vas no question in the Courts n1ind 
that the employee-employer relationship existed and 
based on that fact the defendant corporation is not being 
severely punished because it failed to adhere to the pro-
visions as set forth in 34-10-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
There is not a permanent infringement nor a temporary 
infringement upon the constitutional rights of the de-
fendant corporation, and \vhen a la\\Tful demand is 1nade 
for "Tages to an employee, they n1ay either pay the \Ya.ges 
due or refuse to pay the "·ages and subject then1selYe~ 
to the penalty provision of 34-10-6. Thi~ is not arbitrary 
or capricious and the defendant corporation have elected 
to deny the clain1s, subjecting then1selves to the penalty 
provision of the statute. 
The statute in its application Is not a retroactive 
penalt~,. provision and it i~ not unreasonable and burden-
sou1e upon the defendant. The statute is definite as to 
the time "'"hen the penalt~T begins to run and further 
thro\Ys the burden upon thP plaintiffs to n1ake a de1uand 
for their ",.agrs. For the defendant to \Yillfull~· refuse to 
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pay said clai1n hP subjects hirnself to the penalty provi-
sion of the statute. 
The plaintiffs in this 1natter spent a great deal of 
ti1nP in negotiations and in trying to seek a settlement 
'vith the defendant corporation and did not deliberately 
,,·ait for the penalty statute to accumulate. The plain-
tiffs, however, could not wait beyond the 60 day period in 
order to protect their rights. This statute is purely social 
in nature to protect a certain class of citizens, and the 
statute is constitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted to this Court, that the 
statute in question herein, r~ritle 34, Chapter 10, Section 
6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is clearly constitutional 
and the lower court was correct in its decision in this 
n1atter and the Court should not be reversed. 
Dated this 23rd day of October, _..\.D. 19GO. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN C. BEASLIN 
SIMMONS, BEASLIN & NYGAARD 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
423 West ~lain 
Vernal, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
